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THE DOG DAYS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
Kit Kinports*
Last Halloween the highest court in the land literally went to the dogs,
as the Supreme Court heard argument in cases involving two Florida
narcotics-detection dogs, Aldo and Franky. In Florida v. Harris, Aldo
finished best in show, with the Court holding for all practical purposes that
a trained drug dog’s positive alert creates probable cause to search.1 The
Court put Franky on a shorter leash, however, concluding in Florida v.
Jardines that a dog conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it
physically intrudes on a suspect’s property for the purpose of collecting
evidence.2
Both decisions had the effect of articulating bright-line rules, thereby
deviating from precedent that favored a more amorphous standard
considering all the surrounding circumstances. Totality-of-thecircumstances inquiries can be messy and unpredictable, but if done fairly
they can also lead to sensible outcomes. By contrast, purportedly clear rules
tend to oversimplify, creating an inherent risk of overinclusion or
underinclusion. The recent rulings in the drug-dog cases illustrate these
dangers, as Harris exhibits overconfidence in the accuracy of drug-dog
alerts while Jardines threatens to underprotect less privileged
socioeconomic classes.
I. ALDO AND PROBABLE CAUSE
On two separate occasions, Clayton Harris had the misfortune of being
pulled over by Officer William Wheetley for a minor traffic offense. Both
times, the officer’s drug-detection dog, Aldo, alerted to the door handle on
the driver’s side of Harris’s truck. Although the officer’s subsequent
searches of the truck did not reveal any drugs the dog was trained to detect,
the first uncovered materials used in manufacturing methamphetamine.
Harris was arrested following that first search for possessing
pseudoephedrine, a key ingredient of methamphetamine, and he later
admitted that he regularly used and produced the narcotic. The Florida
Supreme Court ruled that Aldo’s positive alert was insufficient to create
probable cause to search the truck absent specific details about the dog’s
*
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133 S. Ct. 1050, 1057 (2013).
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training regimen and performance in the field, including any alerts that had
not led to the discovery of narcotics.3
In an opinion written by Justice Kagan, a unanimous Supreme Court
reversed the Florida court. The Supreme Court’s decision was not
particularly surprising, given its ruling thirty years earlier in Illinois v.
Gates redefining probable cause using a totality-of-the-circumstances
approach.4 Describing the lower court’s opinion in Harris as creating “a
strict evidentiary checklist,” the Supreme Court noted that its concept of
probable cause, by contrast, “rejected rigid rules, bright-line tests, and
mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things-considered
approach.”5
More problematic was the Court’s sweeping rule that a drug dog’s
positive alert is enough to create a presumption of probable cause so long as
the dog either “recently and successfully completed a training program” or
was certified by a “bona fide organization.”6 Rather than a totality-of-thecircumstances approach, this statement resembles the bright-line rules the
Court’s probable cause jurisprudence has recently avoided.
Admittedly, the Court qualified its holding with the parenthetical
“subject to any conflicting evidence,” and then went on to require that
defendants be given an opportunity to contest a drug dog’s reliability either
by cross-examining the dog’s handler or presenting their own witnesses.7
This caveat is presumably what enabled the Court to claim its opinion
called for an examination of “all the facts surrounding a dog’s alert,” just
like “every inquiry into probable cause.”8
For all practical purposes, however, an alert by a trained dog will now
lead to a finding of probable cause because the defense is not likely to have
access to information necessary to challenge a dog’s reliability. Details
about training programs the dog and its handler completed are in the hands
of the government, and a defendant who was not on the scene during the
dog sniff cannot know whether the dog was cued by its handler or working
under “unfamiliar conditions.”9 In addition, evidence concerning the dog’s
performance in the field may not even be available. In Harris, for example,
records were kept only of Aldo’s alerts that actually led to an arrest.10 Even
where such information exists, some courts have denied defense requests

3

See Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 759 (Fla. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013).
See 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983).
5
Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1055, 1056.
6
Id. at 1057.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 1058.
9
Id. at 1057–58 (suggesting ways a defendant might challenge a dog’s reliability).
10
Id. at 1054.
4
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for discovery of a dog’s records,11 and in Harris, the Solicitor General took
the position that such evidence should “typically” not be discoverable.12
Even if field records are turned over to the defendant, the Court’s
ruling in Harris suggested that this data is not entitled to much weight in
probable cause determinations. Although at one point the Court’s opinion
cryptically mentioned that field records “may sometimes be relevant,” it
devoted a paragraph to defending the view that “in most cases” field
performance has “relatively limited import.”13 In addition to providing little
information about false negatives, the Court thought field data may
“markedly overstate . . . real false positives” if a dog alerts where drugs are
too well concealed or too small to be discovered.14 Though these
hypotheticals seem somewhat unrealistic, the Court expressed a distinct
preference for evidence of a dog’s performance in “controlled testing
environments.”15 But a controlled classroom provides an imperfect sense of
a dog’s accuracy as well. It may not have the same distractions or
complications present in the field, and may generate skewed results absent
double-blind testing where neither the handler nor the dog knows the
location of the drugs.16 Moreover, the “practical and common-sensical”17
nature of Gates’s totality-of-the-circumstances test suggests that the dog’s
actual track record under similar circumstances ought to be considered for
whatever light it can shed on the probable cause inquiry.18 Therefore, the
largely meaningless opportunity Harris affords defendants to rebut the
prosecution’s showing of probable cause does not diminish the bright-line
nature of the Court’s ruling.
Additionally, the Court offered no justification for creating a drug-dog
exception to the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. Although the
11

See Richard E. Myers II, Detector Dogs and Probable Cause, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 19–20
(2006).
12
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20, Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050
(No. 11-817); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (No. 11-817) (citing
the “burden . . . on law enforcement”).
13
Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056, 1057.
14
Id. at 1057.
15
Id. The Court’s suggestion that an unproductive alert might also result from the residual odor of
drugs is discussed infra at notes 31–38 and accompanying text.
16
See KENNETH FURTON ET AL., THE SCIENTIFIC WORKING GROUP ON DOG AND ORTHOGONAL
DETECTOR GUIDELINES (SWGDOG) 136 (2010); see also id. at 138 (recommending that dogs’ fieldperformance records be kept).
17
Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1055; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
18
See Max Minzner, Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 913–15
(2009) (analogizing probable cause to baseball batting averages and calling for consideration of the
success rates of individual officers and their units in assessing probable cause); cf. Erica Goldberg,
Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 31), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116389
(suggesting that statistical evidence be used in cases, like those involving drug dogs, where probable
cause is based on “a device . . . that has essentially replaced the police officer”).
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Solicitor General’s amicus brief pleaded for a bright-line test to provide
guidance to law enforcement, the Government did not distinguish drug-dog
alerts from any other probable cause inquiry.19 Gates justified the decision
to abandon the rigid two-pronged definition of probable cause the Court had
previously applied to informants on the grounds that tips come in “many
shapes and sizes,”20 and here too the reliability of drug-dog alerts varies. No
national or uniform standards govern the programs used to train drugdetection dogs.21 Moreover, the accuracy of an alert depends on the
particular dog’s abilities as well as the conditions under which it is
working.22
In addition to deviating from thirty years of probable cause precedent,
the opinion in Harris glossed over concerns about drug dogs’ reliability—
an issue that has surfaced in the literature and that was addressed by the
court below, in the Supreme Court briefs, and at oral argument.23 Though
the scientific understanding of drug-detection dogs is still developing,24
research has shown that a significant percentage of positive alerts do not
lead to the discovery of narcotics.25 In many cases, errors result from
miscommunications between the handler and the dog—sometimes even
from the handler’s subconscious cues, such as prolonging the dog’s
exposure to places where the handler suspects narcotics are hidden.26
Moreover, without some indication of the base rate of criminality—i.e., the
odds of drug activity—an accurate assessment of a dog’s reliability cannot
be made.27

19

See Brief for the United States, supra note 12, at 27–28.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 232.
21
See Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the Dog: Extending the Protection of the
Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 NEB. L. REV. 735, 759–62 (2007).
22
See William S. Helton, Overview of Scent Detection Work: Issues and Opportunities, in CANINE
ERGONOMICS: THE SCIENCE OF WORKING DOGS 83, 85 (William S. Helton ed., 2009) [hereinafter
CANINE ERGONOMICS].
23
See Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 768–69 (Fla. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013); Brief for
Respondent at 33–36, Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (No. 11-817); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
12, at 13–15.
24
See CANINE ERGONOMICS, supra note 22, at x (“The scientific analysis of working dogs is
emerging but underdeveloped . . . .”); FURTON ET AL., supra note 16, at 10 (noting that there is a
“limited amount of reliable scientific information” and “limited peer reviewed research on error rates”).
25
See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae: The National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. at 6–9,
Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (No. 11-817) (citing various studies showing success rates of 20%, 26%, and
44%); Lisa Lit et al., Handler Beliefs Affect Scent Detection Dog Outcomes, 14 ANIMAL COGNITION
387, 390 (2011) (finding that only one out of eighteen dogs did not falsely alert in a double-blind test).
26
See William S. Helton, Conclusion: Working Dogs and the Future, in CANINE ERGONOMICS,
supra note 22, at 325, 326; Lit et al., supra note 25, at 390–91 (finding in double-blind study that dogs
were more likely to erroneously alert in places the handler had falsely been told contained contraband).
27
See Myers, supra note 11, at 13–16 (using Bayes’s Theorem to explain that a positive alert by a
dog with a 90%–95% accuracy rate indicates the presence of drugs in only approximately 16% of cases
in a population where only one in fifty people are in possession of drugs).
20
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Furthermore, as the Court pointed out in Harris, a dog “recognizes an
odor, not a drug.”28 As a result, a positive alert may occur when the dog
detects the smell of either a chemical ingredient of narcotics that is present
in legal products, or an innocuous item associated with drugs or the dog’s
training.29 A dog’s detection of such items using its sense of smell should be
treated no differently than a police officer’s visual observation of them,
which is not necessarily sufficient in and of itself to give rise to probable
cause.30
The dog may also give a positive signal that yields no evidence of
drugs where it detects residual odor. The Harris opinion did address this
issue, denying that an alert to residual odor constitutes a false positive.
Rather, the Court argued, a dog “should alert” to a scent “even if the
substance is gone.”31 And the Court rejected as irrelevant what it called “the
mere chance” that drugs might no longer be present, instead concluding
without support or analysis that there is still “a fair probability” of
discovering “either drugs or evidence of a drug crime (like the precursor
chemicals in Harris’s truck).”32
Of course, the residual-odor theory can be proffered—and cannot be
refuted—for any unproductive search, and in fact was the Court’s “likely”
explanation for Aldo’s two positive alerts to Harris’s vehicle.33 Even more
important, probable cause to search requires an assessment of the odds that
evidence is currently located in the place to be searched, not that it was
there at some indeterminate time in the past.34 Officer Wheetley could not
say for how long Aldo could still detect residual odor,35 and estimates of
dogs’ capacity to smell residual odors vary depending on, among other
things, the particular drug at issue.36 Admittedly, as the Court pointed out, a
police officer who smells the distinctive odor of marijuana might likewise
be detecting residual odor.37 But a dog, unlike an officer, cannot
communicate the strength of a detected scent or its level of certainty that the
odor is actually present.38 Paradoxically, then, a dog’s much more sensitive
28

Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056 n.2.
See Myers, supra note 11, at 4 (citing baggies and air freshener by way of example).
30
See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 3.6(b), at 388–98 (5th ed. 2012) (citing conflicting cases).
31
Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056 n.2 (emphasis added).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 1059 (justifying this conclusion on the grounds that Harris admitted he used and
manufactured methamphetamine “on a regular basis”).
34
See, e.g., Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 210–12 (1932).
35
See Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 773–74 (Fla. 2011), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013).
36
See Brief of Amici Curiae Fourth Amendment Scholars in Support of Respondent at 28–30,
Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (No. 11-817) (citing sources reporting that the chemical ingredients of cocaine
and heroin can be detected for two hours and three days respectively).
37
Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056 n.2.
38
See CANINE ERGONOMICS, supra note 22, at 87.
29
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nose is a less reliable indicator that drugs are still on the scene than the
human sense of smell.
A defensible argument can be made both for defining probable cause
by a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry and for creating bright-line rules,
or at least “presumptive rules for . . . recurring . . . issues.”39 Although the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is notoriously inconsistent on the
subject of bright lines,40 at the very least it should be able to stick to one
approach on any given Fourth Amendment issue. Moreover, fairness
demands a two-way street, and the Court should not reject only bright-line
rules that make it harder to prove probable cause while endorsing ones that
facilitate the prosecution’s case. Harris’s overconfidence in the accuracy of
drug dogs and its disregard for the distinct possibility of error further
suggest that the Court acted prematurely by creating a drug-dog exception
to the totality-of-the-circumstances test. Just like many fixed rules create
problems of overinclusion or underinclusion,41 the one that effectively
emerges from the decision in Harris is overinclusive and threatens to close
off debate concerning an investigative tool whose reliability depends on a
technical understanding that is still evolving.
II. FRANKY AND FOURTH AMENDMENT “SEARCHES”
After receiving an uncorroborated tip that Joelis Jardines was growing
marijuana in his house, a detective and his narcotics-detection dog, Franky,
walked up the driveway to Jardines’s front porch. When the dog alerted
positively at the base of the front door, a search warrant for the home was
issued and a number of marijuana plants were seized. In a five-to-four
decision written by Justice Scalia, the Court determined that the police had
conducted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.42
The majority relied on last year’s decision in United States v. Jones, in
which the Court held that law enforcement officials effected a Fourth
Amendment search when they installed a GPS device on a suspect’s car and
tracked the car’s movements for four weeks.43 In an opinion also authored
by Justice Scalia, the Jones majority made the surprising announcement that
the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy definition of a search44 that the
Court had consistently applied for forty-five years merely “added to,” but
39
Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 227, 256
(1984).
40
See, e.g., Kit Kinports, Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71,
126–28 (2007).
41
For discussion of the distinction between rules and standards, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules
Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with
Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953 (1995).
42
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417–18 (2013).
43
132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
44
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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did not “substitute[] for, the common-law trespassory test.”45 Reasoning that
the Fourth Amendment should at least protect the same “‘degree of
privacy’” recognized at the time of the framing, the Jones majority relied on
common-law notions of trespass to find that government officials conduct a
search when they “obtain[] information by physically intruding on a
constitutionally protected area.”46 Accordingly, Justice Scalia, a persistent
critic of Katz,47 saw no need to analyze GPS tracking under the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test.48
Following in Jones’s footsteps—though without ever using the word
trespass49—the majority in Jardines held that the police committed an
“unlicensed physical intrusion” on “a constitutionally protected area” by
“gathering information” in the curtilage of Jardines’s home.50 The Court
acknowledged that not every entry onto private property constitutes a search
given that permission to enter “may be implied from the habits of the
country.”51 Therefore, the Court explained, police may “approach a home
and knock,” just like any solicitor, delivery person, or other member of the
public, but “the background social norms that invite a visitor to the front
door do not invite him there to conduct a search.”52
Even though Justice Scalia’s opinion again declined to apply the
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test,53 three of the five Justices in the
majority joined a separate opinion written by Justice Kagan, which
described Jardines as an “‘easy cas[e] . . .’ twice over” because the dog also

45

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (emphasis omitted). But see 1 LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 2.1(e), at 593
(observing that Katz “seemed to sound the death knell” for the trespass test).
46
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 & n.3 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). But see
Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 24) (arguing that “Jones purports to restore a trespass test that never previously existed”),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154611.
47
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the
Katz definition as “fuzzy,” “self-indulgent,” and “notoriously unhelpful”).
48
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950. Five members of the Court did, however, apply the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy analysis. Four Justices, in an opinion written by Justice Alito, were critical of the
majority’s novel trespass approach, but agreed that “lengthy monitoring” by means of a GPS device in
the course of investigating “most offenses” constitutes a search under Katz. Id. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Sotomayor also wrote a separate opinion, agreeing with both the
majority and the Alito concurrence, and suggesting she might be prepared to find that “unique attributes
of GPS surveillance” make “even short-term monitoring” a search under Katz. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
49
For the suggestion that the Court did so to avoid reversing the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling
that no trespass occurred under state tort law, see Bradley Pollina, Florida v. Jardines: Why the Supreme
Court Did Not Say “Trespass,” 3 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 19, 21 (2013),
http://wakeforestlawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/PollinaArticle1.pdf.
50
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414, 1415 (2013).
51
Id. at 1415 (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922)).
52
Id. at 1416.
53
See id. at 1417.
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effected a search under Katz.54 The police violated Jardines’s reasonable
expectation of privacy, the concurrence concluded, because Franky
“reveal[ed] within the confines of a home what they could not otherwise
have found there.”55
The four dissenters, in an opinion written by Justice Alito, disagreed on
both counts. On the Jones test, the dissent argued that under an implied
license by custom, trespass law allows even “unwelcome visitors”—
including the police and their dogs—“to use a walkway to approach the
front door of a house and to remain there for a brief time.”56 On the Katz
question, the dissenting opinion thought there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in “odors emanating from a house [that] may be
detected from locations that are open to the public.”57
Although adherents of the Jones test defend it as a way of avoiding the
“thorny” and “‘vexing’” issues created by Katz,58 the elements of the
Jardines definition each create line-drawing issues of their own. On the
most mundane level, the Court might be right that Jardines’s front porch is
the “classic exemplar” of the curtilage of a home.59 But it was on less solid
ground when it claimed that the curtilage is “generally ‘clearly marked’”
and “‘easily understood.’”60 In fact, the Solicitor General’s office argued
that Jardines’s front porch and walkway “may be considered outside the
curtilage.”61 And even the Court admitted that the multi-factor definition of
“curtilage” articulated in United States v. Dunn was not a “finely tuned
formula” that can be “mechanically applied” to “yield[] a ‘correct’ answer
to all extent-of-curtilage questions.”62 The Court proved quite prescient on
that point, as the Dunn factors have spawned a tremendous amount of
litigation.63
Second, an implied license by custom can vary depending on the
norms of a particular location,64 contrary to the Court’s traditional insistence
that the contours of the Fourth Amendment do not “vary from place to place
54

Id. at 1420 (Kagan, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 1417 (majority opinion)).
Id. at 1419.
56
Id. at 1420, 1422 (Alito, J., dissenting).
57
Id. at 1421.
58
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (quoting id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment)); see also Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1407, 1417 (2013) (claiming that the “property-rights
baseline . . . keeps easy cases easy”).
59
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415.
60
Id. (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984)).
61
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 24 n.8, Jardines, 133 S. Ct.
1409 (No. 11-564).
62
480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (listing four factors to be considered in defining curtilage: how far the
area in question was from the home, whether it was “within an enclosure surrounding the home,” how it
was used, and what precautions were taken to “protect [it] from observation by people passing by”).
63
See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 2.4(a), at 811–16.
64
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 220 (2000).
55
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and from time to time.”65 Moreover, permission to enter property is subject
to the complete discretion of the property owner, and individuals can
therefore opt out of the traditional customs.66 Thus, the implied invitation to
“the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters”—and to the police67—
presumably can be revoked by a locked front gate, or a sign that says “No
Solicitors,” “No Dogs,” or even “No Police.”68 As a result, Jardines puts
police officers and courts in the unenviable position of trying to “guess . . .
whether landowners . . . erected fences sufficiently high [or] posted a
sufficient number of warning signs.”69
The final element of the Jardines test turns on a police officer’s
subjective motivation for entering the property. In an effort to remain
faithful to its two-year-old decision in Kentucky v. King, the Jardines
majority acknowledged that police do not conduct a search by approaching
a home and knocking “in order to speak with the occupant, because all are
invited to do that.”70 The seeds of this intent inquiry can be found in Jones,
where the Court observed that a trespass alone does not qualify as a Fourth
Amendment search unless it involves “an attempt to find something or to
obtain information.”71 Yet Jones’s casual references to law enforcement
objectives did not attract much attention, perhaps because it was hard to
imagine any other plausible explanation for attaching a GPS device to
Jones’s vehicle. Therefore, Justice Breyer can hardly be faulted for
expressing surprise during oral argument in Jardines when Justice Scalia
suggested that law enforcement intent is relevant to the Jones analysis.72
The likely source of Justice Breyer’s confusion is, as Justice Scalia
himself noted in his 2011 majority opinion in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, the
Court’s “almost uniform[] reject[ion of] invitations to probe subjective
intent” in Fourth Amendment cases because the Amendment “regulates

65

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996).
See DOBBS, supra note 64, § 96, at 220 (noting that homeowners “have an opportunity, at low
cost, to express [their] dissent from the custom,” for example, by “post[ing] a sign forbidding
salespeople to enter”).
67
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–16 (2013).
68
See Brief for the United States, supra note 61, at 24 (admitting that “[t]he analysis may be
different if . . . the occupant took steps to bar all visitors”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Jardines,
133 S. Ct. 1409 (No. 11-564) (arguing on behalf of the State that “police officers can walk up the front
path, absent a sign or something”).
69
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984).
70
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 n.4 (emphasis omitted).
71
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 n.5 (2012); see also id. at 949 (concluding that the
“installation . . . and . . . use of [a GPS] to monitor” a suspect’s movements qualifies as a search
(emphasis added)).
72
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 68, at 44 (Justice Scalia chiding Jardines’s attorney
for being “wrong not to accept” the relevance of police intent because “our cases support it”); id. at 51
(Justice Breyer noting that the Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions focus on police “behavior” rather
than “subjective motive,” and then commenting, “I don’t know what in Jones changed that”).
66
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conduct rather than thoughts.”73 According to Justice Scalia, the one
“unusual” and “narrow” exception to this practice comes in the
administrative inspection and special needs cases, which recognize an
exception to the warrant requirement only for searches conducted for a
proper regulatory purpose.74 Thus, the Court previously considered
subjective intent “irrelevant” in defining a Fourth Amendment search under
Katz, on the grounds that the key is “the objective effect of [the officers’]
actions,” not that they may have been “‘motivated by a law enforcement
purpose.’”75
In explaining why a police officer’s motive is nonetheless an element
of Jardines’s definition of a search, Justice Scalia reasoned that law
enforcement intent is only irrelevant in Fourth Amendment cases involving
searches that are “objectively reasonable.” In contrast, Jardines turned on
“whether the officer’s conduct was an objectively reasonable search.”76 But
this is the first time the Court has considered an officer’s purpose when
analyzing the “search” half of that equation, as opposed to the “objectively
reasonable” inquiry at issue in the administrative inspection cases.
This final element of the Jardines definition is not only illustrative of
the fluctuation between objective and subjective standards running through
the Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings,77 but is also likely to pose difficult
line-drawing questions for the courts. Does any use of a drug dog on the
curtilage constitute a search, in light of the Jardines majority’s observation
that “a stranger” is not expected “to explore the curtilage of the home with
trained drug dogs”?78 Or would the case have come out the other way if the
officers had also knocked on the door while Franky was sniffing around,
given other language in the opinion suggesting that police exceed the scope
of their implied invitation only if they “enter . . . in order to do nothing but
conduct a search”?79 If so, is the sequencing of the knock and dog sniff
important? Or does even a preliminary knock exceed the scope of the
implied license because the Court focused elsewhere on the
inappropriateness of a visitor conducting a search “before saying hello and
asking permission”?80 On the facts before it in Jardines, the Court thought
73
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the officers’ “behavior objectively reveal[ed] a purpose to conduct a
search.”81 But in other cases, law enforcement conduct will be more
equivocal—especially if police are trained to steer clear of Jardines—and
courts will be forced to conduct a subjective inquiry into the officers’ state
of mind.
Even if lower courts prove capable of administering the Supreme
Court’s new test and discerning law enforcement’s motivations, the
majority did not explain why homeowners impliedly invite police onto their
property to conduct investigations that involve questioning but not
searching. In Kentucky v. King, for example, police had witnessed an
apparent drug deal outside an apartment building, and they were knocking
on the door of the apartment they thought the suspect had entered.82 The
officers in King were certainly trying to “find something” or “obtain
information” as required by Jones.83 But the Jardines opinion at some
points (though not others) subtly tweaked that language to focus on the
narrower law enforcement purpose of “conduct[ing] a search.”84 That
modification of Jones adds an element of circularity to the definition of a
search. Furthermore, if “[t]he scope of a license” can be restricted to “a
specific purpose,”85 it seems unreasonable to assume a homeowner would
impliedly invite the police onto her property to use any investigative
technique designed to generate evidence of her guilt—or to approach the
front door for any reason other than to solicit donations for a police
association charity, respond to a call for help, or look for witnesses or
assistance solving a crime committed by someone else.86
The inconsistencies and confusion generated by the majority’s
approach are not the most troubling aspects of Jardines. The Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has traditionally—and appropriately—accorded
the same level of protection to every “castle,” no matter how grand or
humble.87 Yet the focus on property rights threatens to privilege those of
higher socioeconomic status.88 The Court considered the front porch of
81
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Jardines’s single-family residence part of the protected curtilage of a home,
but it is difficult to see what “constitutionally protected area” would have
been invaded if Franky had alerted from the public walkway outside a row
house or trailer home or from the hallway of an apartment building or
residential hotel that could be accessed by anyone. Likewise, Jardines
presumably means that police conduct a search when they enter the
curtilage to search the garbage of those who pay a premium to have it
collected from the backyard, but not necessarily when the garbage is found
on the curb.89
The Katz approach endorsed by the three concurring Justices does not
share the same defect of underinclusiveness because it does not turn on
where a drug dog happens to be standing. It does, however, create problems
of its own. The reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis is hardly a
model of clarity either,90 though it offers an alternative to a physicalintrusion test that is no less outdated today than it was when Katz was
decided.91
Nevertheless, Justice Kagan’s conclusion in Jardines—that the dog
sniff violated the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy—is difficult
to reconcile with the Court’s precedents. The concurring opinion claimed
that the thermal imaging decision in Kyllo v. United States “already
resolved” the case by holding that police effect a search when they “‘use[] a
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.’”92
Several years after Kyllo, however, Illinois v. Caballes distinguished
thermal imagers from narcotics-detection dogs in refusing to find that a
dog’s positive alert to a car during a lawful traffic stop constituted a
search.93 Justice Kagan’s concurrence in Jardines in turn attempted to
distinguish Caballes on the grounds that the Court has routinely found a
lower expectation of privacy in cars than in homes.94 But, as reflected in the
precedents Justice Kagan cited, the Court has used that rationale to create
exceptions to the warrant requirement and has never denied that car
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interiors carry a sufficient expectation of privacy to meet the Katz test at
issue in Jardines.95
Moreover, the distinction between homes and vehicles was not the
salient factor for the Caballes majority. Rather, the Caballes Court claimed
that its conclusion was “entirely consistent” with Kyllo because the critical
fact in Kyllo was the thermal imager’s ability to “detect[] lawful activity,”
whereas a drug dog that “only reveals the possession of contraband
‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’”96 For this point, Caballes
relied on dicta in United States v. Place, where the Court described a dog
sniff as a sui generis investigative tool that does not effect a search because
it “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics” and therefore “does
not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from
public view.”97 Jardines may have been at the intersection of
Place/Caballes and Kyllo, but it was clearly an overstatement to say the
issue had already been decided.
This point was not lost on the Jardines dissenters, who observed that
the Kagan concurrence made “a very similar, if not identical argument” to
one that was raised by Justice Souter’s dissent in Caballes and obviously
failed to persuade a majority of that Court.98 But Justice Alito’s dissenting
opinion in Jardines did not elaborate further, and therefore did not
expressly endorse either Place’s characterization of dogs as sui generis or
the notion that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband.
Rather, the dissent relied primarily on a “plain view” rationale, that one
lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in anything police agents,
including dogs, can detect with their own senses.99 But given that the canine
nose is so much more sensitive than its human counterpart—and that here it
was trained on a home—this argument required the dissent to deal with
Kyllo. Justice Alito made an unpersuasive effort to dismiss Kyllo as “a
decision about the use of new technology” and the dangers of “‘advancing
technology.’”100 Dogs, the dissent argued, are neither new nor a form of
technology. But, again, that was not the Caballes Court’s understanding of
Kyllo. Caballes distinguished dogs from thermal imagers because they do
not reveal any lawful activity, not because they are more analogous to
95
See, e.g., New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114–15 (1986) (concluding that intrusion into a car’s
interior constituted a search); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591–92 & n.8 (1974) (plurality opinion)
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search).
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Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1424 (Alito, J., dissenting).
99
Id. For a possible explanation why the dissent ignored Place, see infra note 110 and
accompanying text.
100
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
35 (2001)).
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human noses than technological devices. Moreover, a dog may fall
somewhere along the continuum between a person and a mechanical
instrument, but relying on the plain view doctrine to compare a police
officer’s sense of smell with something that is between 10,000 and 100,000
times more sensitive101 is “unsound.”102 Thus, the dissent was no more
successful than the concurrence in trying to reconcile its position with both
Kyllo and the Place line of cases.
The Jardines majority, of course, avoided that difficult task by skirting
the Katz analysis altogether. Rather, Justice Scalia purported to adopt a
bright-line rule—that a physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area to perform a search constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. But like
many attempts to forge a clear rule, the Court’s test turns out to be fuzzier
than it first appears and is underinclusive by affording less protection to
certain types of residences.
The Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis may be
amorphous and subject to varying interpretations, but it is a commonsense
standard just like Gates’s totality-of-the-circumstances concept of probable
cause. The problem is not necessarily the Katz test itself, but the Court’s
application of it in ways that defy reasonable expectations,103 such as the
refusal to find a reasonable expectation of privacy whenever a suspect is in
public or turns information over to a third party.104 Like other inquiries that
consider all the surrounding circumstances, Katz could lead to sensible
results and avoid the underinclusion problem plaguing Jardines if the Court
were to truly analyze what reasonable people expect.105
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ALDO AND FRANKY
Although the rulings in Harris and Jardines are each subject to
criticism in their own right, so too is the relationship between the two
decisions. It was presumably no coincidence that both cases were argued on
the same day, but the tension between them was left largely unexplored in
either opinion.
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The majority’s property-based ruling in Jardines incentivizes police to
keep their dogs off private property, thereby diminishing the dogs’
reliability. A dog’s accuracy depends on its proximity to the target, and
there is little scientific data measuring how reliably a dog can detect
narcotics even from outside a home106 much less from beyond the curtilage.
As Jardines moves dogs farther away from a suspect’s property, the
probability of error increases and Harris’s confidence that a positive alert
gives rise to probable cause becomes even more questionable.
As discussed above, none of the opinions in Jardines reiterated the
argument initially made in Place—that dog sniffs are binary searches that
disclose only the presence or absence of contraband. In fact, Jardines’s only
mention of Place came in Justice Scalia’s opinion, which cited the case for
the proposition that the State had “support in our case law” for a Katz
argument the majority then declined to reach.107 But both the Kagan
concurrence and the Alito dissent did discuss Caballes, with the concurring
Justices distinguishing it and the dissenters relying on it. None of the
Justices seemed willing to repudiate Caballes’s holding that the dog sniff of
a properly stopped vehicle is not a search, even though both opinions
ignored the decision’s central rationale. Caballes did not turn on the lesser
expectation of privacy in vehicles or on the analogy to the human sense of
smell. Rather, Caballes was fundamentally derived from Place.
To be sure, there is good reason to push Place off center stage. First,
Place’s sui generis argument is of questionable pedigree—whether a dog
sniff effects a Fourth Amendment search was not briefed or argued in either
the Supreme Court or the court below, and yet the Court resolved it in two
paragraphs of dicta unsullied by a single supporting citation.108
Nevertheless, the dicta took on a life of its own, with the Court repeating it
in later opinions—and ultimately Caballes—that relied on Place (and then
each other) for support.109 On a more substantive level, the definition of a
search should not turn on what the police uncover, for the Fourth
Amendment is designed to protect the guilty as well as the innocent. As
Justice Kennedy observed several times during the oral argument in
Jardines, the no-reasonable-expectation-of-privacy-in-contraband mantra is
“circular” reasoning.110 (Ironically, he then chose to join the opinion that
strayed the least from Place and Caballes, Justice Alito’s dissent.) Finally,
as an empirical matter, scientific understanding of drug-detection dogs has
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advanced in the thirty years since Place was decided such that the sui
generis label no longer seems accurate. Justice Souter forcefully made this
point in his lone dissent in Caballes, observing that “[t]he infallible dog . . .
is a creature of legal fiction.”111 While his argument fell on deaf ears, the
current Court’s apparent inclination to snub Place and refashion Caballes
may signal a welcome willingness to rethink the wisdom of the Place dicta.
But that puts Jardines on a collision course with Harris. If a dog sniff
is not viewed as a sui generis investigative tool that discloses only the
presence of contraband, it becomes harder to defend Harris’s conclusion
that an alert from a trained dog generally gives rise to probable cause.
Contrary to the sentiments expressed in the popular song, then, the dog
days are far from over,112 and Harris and Jardines have not yet put the
Fourth Amendment issues surrounding drug-detection dogs to bed. Not
only is there an inherent tension between the two opinions, but they both
generate rigid rules in place of the more commonsense totality-of-thecircumstances standards favored in the Court’s precedents. By deliberately
sidestepping the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis in
Jardines, and effectively ignoring the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances
concept of probable cause in Harris, both opinions essentially draw bright
lines that, like many rules, lack precision and thus suffer from
underinclusiveness or overinclusiveness.
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